Securing Localization With Hidden and Mobile Base Stations by Capkun, Srdjan et al.
Secure Localization With Hidden and
Mobile Base Stations
Srdjan ˇCapkun Mario ˇCagalj Mani Srivastava
Informatics and Mathematical School of Computer and Networked & Embedded
Modelling Department Communication Sciences Systems Laboratory (NESL)
Technical University Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale Electrical Engineering Department
of Denmark (DTU) de Lausanne (EPFL) University of California
DK-2800 Lyngby, Denmark CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland Los Angeles, CA, 90095
sca@imm.dtu.dk mario.cagalj@epfl.ch mbs@ucla.edu
Abstract— Until recently, the problem of localization
in wireless networks has been mainly studied in a non-
adversarial setting. Only recently, a number of solutions
have been proposed that aim to detect and prevent attacks
on localization systems. In this work, we propose a new
approach to secure localization based on hidden and
mobile base stations. Our approach enables secure local-
ization with a broad spectrum of localization techniques:
ultrasonic or radio, based on received signal strength
or signal time of flight. Through several examples we
show how this approach can be used to secure node-
centric and infrastructure-centric localization schemes. We
further show how this approach can be applied to secure
localization in sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, researchers have proposed a num-
ber of positioning and ranging techniques for wireless
networks [43], [44], [35], [3], [20], [7]. The use of these
techniques is broad and ranges from enabling network-
ing functions (i.e., position-based routing) to enabling
location-related applications (e.g., access control, data
harvesting).
The proposed techniques were mainly studied in non-
adversarial settings. Ranging and positioning techniques
are, however, highly vulnerable to attacks from dis-
honest nodes and external attackers; dishonest nodes
can report false position and distance information in
order to cheat on their locations; external attackers can
spoof measured positions of honest nodes. Positioning
and ranging techniques in wireless networks mainly
rely on measurements of the times of flight of radio
(RF ToF) or ultrasound signals (US ToF), and on the
measurements of received strengths of radio signals of
devices (RF RSS). An attacker can generally influence
all these measurements by jamming and delaying signals,
and by modifying their signal strengths. Positioning
systems based on ultrasound time of flight (US ToF) and
those based on measurements of signal strength of radio
signals (RF RSS) are particulary vulnerable to position
spoofing attacks. Systems based on radio time of flight
measurements are less vulnerable to attacks because of
the high speed of signal propagation,
Recently, a number of secure positioning techniques
were proposed [25], [26], [10], [28], [29] to cope
with these problems. These mechanisms rely on GPS,
high speed hardware, directional antennas, or on robust
statistics.
In this paper, we propose a different approach to
secure positioning that relies on a set of covert base
stations used for secure positioning. By covert base
stations (CBS), we mean base stations whose positions
are not known to the attacker at the time of the execution
of secure positioning. In our system, positions of covert
base stations represent a secret input (a key) to the
system. Covert base stations can be realized by hiding
or disguising static base station or by the random motion
of mobile base stations. Typically, covert base stations
are passive.
We show through three example protocols how covert
base stations can be used to secure node-centric and
infrastructure-centric positioning, as well as positioning
in sensor networks. We discuss how security of the
proposed protocols depends on the precision of the
positioning and ranging techniques, and on the number
of the covert base stations. We capture this analytically.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows.
In Section II, we present our system model. In Sec-
tions III and IV we present protocols for secure position-
ing in infrastructure-centric and node-centric systems,
respectively. In Section V, we show how mobile base
stations can be applied to secure positioning in sensor
networks. In Section VI, we analyze our schemes. In
Section VII, we overview the related work. We conclude
the paper in Section VIII.
II. MODEL
In this section, we describe our system and attacker
models.
A. System model
Our system consists of a set of covert base stations
(CBS) and a set of public base stations (PBS) forming
a positioning infrastructure. Here, by covert base sta-
tions we mean those base stations whose positions are
known only to the authority controlling the verification
infrastructure. To prevent that their positions are discov-
ered through radio signal analysis, covert base stations
are silent on the wireless channel; they only listen to the
on-going communication.
In our system covert and public base stations know
their positions or can obtain their positions securely
(e.g., through secure GPS [25]). Here, we assume that
the attackers cannot tamper with these positions nor
compromise the base stations.
We also assume that every legitimate node shares a
secret key with the base stations, or that base stations
hold an authentic public key of the node. This key is
established/obtained through the authority controlling the
verification infrastructure prior to position verification.
Here, all communication between the authority and a
node is performed through a public base station, whereas
the hidden stations remain passive.
We further assume that covert base stations can mea-
sure received signal strength or have an ultrasound
interfaces through which they perform ranging.
In most of this work, we assume that covert base
stations are static. Thus, their mutual communication
and their communication to the verification authority is
performed through a channel that preserves their location
privacy; this communication channel is typically wired
(or infrared), such that they cannot be detected by the
attackers. In Section V, we modify our assumptions and
we assume that the base stations are mobile, and that
their mutual communication is wireless.
B. Attacker model
We observe two types of attacks: internal and ex-
ternal. Internal attacks are those in which a dishonest
or compromised node (internal attacker) reports a false
position or convinces the positioning infrastructure that it
is at a false position. External attacks are those in which
an external attacker convinces an honest node and the
positioning infrastructure that the node is at a different
position from its true position (i.e. the attacker spoofs
node’s position).
We observe two types of positioning systems: node-
centric and infrastructure-centric. By a node-centric po-
sitioning system, we mean that a node computes its
position by observing signals received from public base
stations with known locations. If the positioning system
is node-centric, internal attacks are generally straight-
forward; a the attacker simply lies about the position
that it computed. Infrastructure-centric positioning sys-
tems are those in which the infrastructure computes
positions of nodes based on their mutual communi-
cation. In multilateration-based approaches, an internal
attacker can cheat on its position by cheating on ranging
mechanisms (i.e. by reporting false signal strengths and
times of signal sending/reception). In time difference
of arrival (TDOA) systems, an attacker can cheat by
sending signals to base stations at different times (in
some cases, the attacker would need to have directional
antennas).
Attacks by external attackers are similar to those
performed by internal attackers. An external attacker can
perform timing attacks by delaying (through jamming) or
speeding-up (wormhole attacks [22]) the signals, or can
performs power level modification attacks by changing
the power levels at which nodes and the base stations
transmit.
In this attacker model, we assume that the attackers
know the positions of the public base stations and thus
can modify computed ranges and time differences such
that they are consistent with the false position.
III. INFRASTRUCTURE-CENTRIC POSITIONING WITH
HIDDEN BASE STATIONS
In this section, we describe a simple solution for se-
curing infrastructure-centric positioning systems, based
on time difference of arrival (TDOA) and covert base
stations.
TDOA is the process of positioning a source of signal
in two (respectively three) dimensions by finding the
intersection of multiple hyperbolas (or hyperboloids)
based on the time difference of arrival between the
signal reception at multiple base stations. An hyperboloid
is defined as a surface, that has a constant distance
difference from two points (in our case two base sta-
tions). Using two hyperbolas (three base stations) we
can obtain two dimensional device positions, and using
three hyperboloids (four receivers) we can determine
three dimensional positions. The operation of the TDOA
technique is shown on Figure 1. Node A sends a radio
signal, and the verifiers measure the difference between
the times t1, t2, t3, t4 of the signal reception at each
verifier and determine the position of A.
One of the main advantages of TDOA is that node
positioning does not require communication from the
base stations to the mobile nodes: the base stations locate
mobile nodes measuring signal reception times at each
base station. This is why TDOA is well suited for secure
positioning with hidden base stations.
In our protocol, the base stations are hidden, and
only listen to the beacons sent by the nodes. Upon
receiving the beacons, the base stations compute node’s
location with TDOA, and check if this location is well
consistent with the time differences. By well consistent
we mean that the computed position is not to far from the
hyperbolas constructed with measured time differences
(Figure 1). TDOA with hidden base stations is designed
to detect both internal and external attacks, and relies on
the assumption that the attackers can guess the positions
of base stations only with a very low probability. The
protocol is executed as follows.
TDOA with hidden base stations
1 PBS(ts) → A : N
2 A→ ∗ : m = {A,N, sigKA(A,N)}
3 CBSn : receive m at tnr
: with t1r, ..., tnr , compute p with TDOA
: if
∑
i>j(|tir − tjr| − h(p, i, j))2 ≤ ∆ and
maxi(tir − ts) ≤ T
then pA = p; else reject p
Here, p is a position of node A computed from the
measured time differences and it is the solution to the
following least-square problem:
p = argmin
p∗
∑
i>j
(|tir − tjr| − h(p∗, i, j))2
where h(i, j, p∗) is the difference of signal reception
times at CBSi and CBSj , if the signal is sent from
position p∗. ∆ is the maximal expected inconsistency
between the computed position and the measured time
differences. This inconsistency is caused by the errors in
measurements of reception times and by pair-wise clock
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Fig. 1. An example of positioning with Time Difference Of Arrival.
The base stations CBS measure the differences of signal arrival
times, and compute the position of node A.
drifts of the base stations. T is the time within which a
node needs to reply to a challenge issued by a public base
station; this response time is important for the prevention
of some replay attacks and to ensure message freshness.
N is a fresh nonce. Note that the covert base stations
know which nonce is sent by the public station.
A. Security analysis
Conventional TDOA schemes are vulnerable to both
internal and external attacks. An internal attacker can
send messages to base stations, with appropriate delays
(potentially using directional antennas) and thus cheat on
its location; external attackers can jam and delay node’s
original messages and thus spoof its location.
With covert base stations, these attacks are prevented;
to successfully cheat, the attackers need to know where
the base stations are located. Otherwise, the attacker
needs to guess the locations of the base stations, and per-
form appropriate timing attacks. The attacker’s cheating
success depends on the system precision ∆. Essentially,
∆ defines the size of attacker’s guessing space. Simply, if
∆ is large, a false position will be more likely accepted,
as the tolerance to inconsistencies will be higher. In
Section VI, we investigate in more detail the dependence
of attacker’s success on ∆.
In addition, we need to consider one more external
attack to TDOA. This attack is performed as follows:
(1) Attacker jams the original positioning message (m)
sent by node A; (2) Attacker replays m from a location
p′A. As a result, the base stations will be convinced that
the node A is located at p′A, whereas its true position is
pA. In order to mount this attack, an attacker needs to
be able to jam all hidden base stations, which without
knowing where they are located requires a lot of power
and resources. Furthermore, the attacker needs to have
faster processing at nodes than regular mobile nodes.
Finally, in order to show that the node A is at p′A, the
attacker needs to have access to this location. Still, this
attack is feasible for a resourceful attacker.
Using covert base stations, this attack is partially
prevented by the challenge-response scheme. In our
protocol, the node is expected to reply to a challenge
nonce N within a period T , which limits the time during
which the attacker can mount the attack. Here, T is
estimated based on the expected signal propagation times
and node processing time. We note that if our simple
challenge-response scheme is replaced by a more effi-
cient distance-bounding protocol, this and similar attacks
can be completely prevented. In some implementations,
this will require some specialized hardware at the side of
nodes and base stations [5]. The same attacks can also
be prevented through precise time synchronization.
In our protocol, node location privacy is not preserved.
However, this protocol can be enhanced to include public
base station authentication which prevents an attacker
from challenging the node and from requesting from it
to send positioning signals disclosing its location. Other
attacks are possible on node’s location privacy [36], [19],
[37], [40], [23], [24], but coping with these attacks is out
of the scope of this paper.
IV. NODE-CENTRIC POSITIONING WITH HIDDEN
BASE STATIONS
In this section, we present a protocol for secure
positioning in node-centric positioning systems. Here,
we assume that the node computed its position through
a non-secure positioning system. This position is then
reported to the infrastructure comprised of covert base
stations, which then verifies if the position is correct. In
this context, internal attacks are related to nodes lying
about their locations, whereas external attacks are more
complex, and assume that the attacker spoofs node’s
position and then cheats on the position verification
mechanisms.
To cope with these attacks, we propose a position ver-
ification protocol that relies on hidden base stations. In
this protocol, node A reports a position pF to CBS. CBS
then measures its distance dmF to the node (passively) and
verifies if the reported position pF corresponds to the
measured distance. Our protocol is executed as follows
(assuming that the distance between the CBS and the
node is measured using ultrasound):
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Fig. 2. False position report by node A to the covert base station.
pA is the true node position, pF is the fake node position (reported
by A to CBS), pCBS is the position of CBS. dcF = d(pF , pCBS) is
the (false) distance between CBS and A, computed by CBS, dmF is
the (false) distance between A to CBS measured passively by CBS.
If |dcF − dmF | ≤ ∆, then pA = pF .
Position verification with hidden base stations
1 PBS(ts) → A : N
2 A→ (rf)∗ : mrf = pF , sigKA(rf, pF , N)
(us) : mus = pF , sigKA(us, pF , N)
3 CBS : receive mrf at trf and mus at tus
: dcF = d(pF , pCBS)
: dmF = (tus − trf )s
: if |dcF − dmF | ≤ ∆ and (trf − ts) ≤ T
then pA = pF ; else reject pA
Here, N is a nonce generated by the public base station,
∆ is a combined positioning and ranging error and T
is the time within which a node needs to reply to a
challenge issued by a public base station.
In this protocol, the infrastructure uses a public base
station to communicate with the node, and a single
covert base station to verify the reported position. PBS
sends a challenge to the node A, which then replies by
sending a radio and an ultrasound messages, containing
the alleged node position pF . CBS then measures the
time difference between the time at which it received
the radio signal (trf ) and the time at which it received
the ultrasound signal (tus), and computes the distance
dcF = d(pF , pCBS) to A. If the reported (possibly fake)
position corresponds to the measured (possibly fake)
distance, CBS concludes that pF is the position of A.
To do this, CBS simply computes the distance dcF =
d(pF , pCBS) between its own position pCBS (which is
unknown to the node) and the reported position pF and
compares it with the measured distance dmF (which A can
enlarge or reduce). If two distances differ by more than
the expected combined positioning and ranging error ∆,
then the position is rejected; else, the position is accepted
as true node position. An additional verification is made
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Fig. 3. Position spoofing attack. Attacker spoofs node A and CBS
into believing that it (the node) is at its (attacker’s) position pF . The
attacker then replays node’s message from pF to fool the position
verification mechanism.
by measuring the node response time T , in order to
prevent replay attacks.
We note that this protocol could be similarly designed
with RF RSS-based ranging techniques.
A. Security analysis
An internal attack in node-centric positioning schemes
is simply a false position report from the node to the
infrastructure. Our protocol detects false position reports
through checking the consistency of the reported position
and of the measured distance. This detection mechanism
relies on the fact that the attacker can guess the distance
of pF to the hidden base station only with a low
probability. We analyze this in detail in Section VI.
External attacks against position verification are more
complex and include position spoofing, jamming and
message replays. Figure 3 shows an external attack on
position verification. Node A is positioned at pA, the
attacker at position pF . The attacker first spoofs the
position of A such that A believes that it is positioned
at pF . Then, by replaying A’s positioning signals (radio
and ultrasound) from pF , the attacker fools the position
verification mechanism. This attack enables the attacker
to convince the device A that it (A) is positioned at pF
and then convinces the covert base station that A is at
pF . One limitation of this attack is that an attacker needs
to have a device at the position where it wants to falsely
place A and that the attacker nodes need to be fairly
synchronized to perform it.
Our position verification protocol partially prevents
this attack by the same technique used in the TDOA
protocol with hidden base stations; the base stations
request that the node replies with the RF message to
the PBS challenge within a time bound T . This limits
the time within which the attacker can mount the attack.
With distance-bounding techniques [5], this attack can
be entirely prevented, as the value of T can be reduced
to nanoseconds.
Similarly to our TDOA-based protocol, the position
verification protocol is also vulnerable to location pri-
vacy threats. Here, the most obvious privacy problem
is that the node discloses its position to any station
that issues a position verification request (step 2 in the
protocol). An attacker can simply listen to the node’s
messages and learn where the node is located. Similarly,
an attacker could send a position verification request
to the node to keep track of the nodes position. These
attacks can be prevented by simply requiring a public
base station to authenticate itself to the node, and by
having a node encrypt the position information that it
sends to the base stations.
V. SECURE POSITIONING IN SENSOR NETWORKS
WITH MOBILE BASE STATIONS
The use of mobile base stations has already been
proposed for data collection, energy preservation, lo-
calization and security in wireless networks [39], [11],
[21]. Many mobile platforms have emerged as a result:
Amigobot [1], Cotsbot [4], Millibot [31], Robomote [12],
and Ragobot [17].
In this section, we describe the use of mobile base
stations for secure positioning in static sensor networks.
A. Motivation
Knowing positions of sensors is essential for bind-
ing the measured data with the place at which it was
measured. Without the position information, most sensor
networks would be made useless. Because of this, a
number of positioning systems have been proposed for
sensor networks (see Section VII). However, most of
these positioning systems were not designed with secu-
rity in mind and are therefore vulnerable to attacks that
can render the information that sensors measure useless.
Recently, a number of secure positioning systems for
sensor networks were proposed, based on robust statis-
tics [28], [29], directional antennas [26] and/or distance
bounding [10]. Here, we take a different approach and
we rely on mobile base stations. We show how mobile
base stations can be used to secure positioning and to
verify the positions of sensor nodes.
B. Scenario
In our scenario, we assume that the sensors compute
their positions through one of the non-secure positioning
algorithms [13], [6], [9], [33], [32], [42], [30], [14], [8].
We further assume that the authority has a number of
mobile base stations (similar to data mules), that know
securely their locations (e.g., through secure GPS [25]).
These mobile base stations can be single-purpose or
multi-purpose, and therefore can be used for only po-
sition verification or also for data collection and other
tasks.
We assume that the mobile base stations share a secret
key with each sensor.
C. Position verification with mobile base stations
The protocol presented in this section is similar to the
position verification protocol presented in Section IV.
That protocol relied on the assumption that the covert
base station is hidden, whereas all communication be-
tween the node and the positioning infrastructure is
performed through the public base station.
Here, position verification is performed through mo-
bile base stations. This is realized such that the base
station sends a verification request to the node from one
location, and then waits for the response at a different
location. Therefore, at the time of position verification,
the node does not know the position of the mobile base
station. In this protocol, the role of a public base station
is thus replaced with base station mobility.
Our protocol is executed as follows:
Position verification with mobile base stations
1 (t1) MBS → A : MBS, N, TR
2 (t2) S → ∗ (rf) : p, MACK(rf, p,MBS, N)
(us) : p, MACK(us, p,MBS, N)
3 MBS : receive (rf) at trf and (us) at tus
: dcS = d(p, pMBS)
: dmS = (tus − trf )s
: if |dc1 − dm1 | ≤ ∆ and (trf − t1) ≤ TR
: then pS = p; else reject pS
Here, K is the secret key shared between the mobile
station MBS and the sensor S; TR is the time after
which the sensor is suppose to send its reply (ideally,
TR = t2−t1). TR is also an estimated time within which
MBS will move to a location different from the one at
which it was at t1.
The operation of our protocol is illustrated on Fig-
ure 4. At time t1 a mobile base station (MBS) is at
position pMBS(t1) and sends a message to the neigh-
boring sensors containing a challenge nonce N and a
time delay TR after which the sensors needs to reply
to the message. Within the time TR, MBS moves to
a different position pMBS(t2) within the circle defined
by its power range when it was at position pMBS(t1).
When at position pMBS(t2), MBS receives a reply from
those sensors which are still in its power range. Based
on received replies, MBS computes the distances to the
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Fig. 4. Position verification in sensor networks. A mobile base
station (MBS) verifies positions of nodes; (a) at time t1 MBS
challenges sensor nodes; (b) at time t2 > t1 the sensors reply to
the challenge and their positions are verified by MBS.
sensors and verifies their positions (this procedure is the
same as in the position verification protocol presented in
Section IV.
Typically, the MBS can perform simultaneous verifi-
cation of positions of multiple sensors. If MBS moves
within the circle defined by its power range at time t1,
it will hear at least 39% of the sensors that were in its
power range at time t1, provided that the sensors are
uniformly distributed over MBSs power range. This is
because the intersection of MBSs power ranges at t1
and at t2 will be at least 39% of the circle surface, given
that MBS moved within its previous power range. At
time t1 MBS broadcasted a challenge to the nodes, and
at time t2, the nodes replied. After position verification,
MBS issues another challenge for the nodes in its power
range whose positions were not verified; then, MBS
moves again and waits for their reply. Hence, as MBS
moves through the network, it will verify only positions
of those sensors which were in the intersections of the
two subsequent power ranges of MBS. This is illustrated
on Figure 5. The trajectory of MBS needs to be unpre-
dictable for the sensor nodes, even if the sensors collude.
One way how to ensure this is to have MBSs move
according to random walk. Given this, if the sensors are
placed on a grid, the time in which the MBS covers the
network can be estimated as O(N logN), where N is
the number of sensors. In [39], [2], the authors provide
a set of analytical and simulation results for coverage
times of mobile stations on sensor grids.
Security and location privacy analysis of this protocol
is very similar to the one of the position verification
protocol presented in Section IV, and thus we do not
repeat it here.
t1 t2
t3
Fig. 5. Progress of position verification in sensor networks with mo-
bile base stations. MBS moves from position pMBS(t1) to pMBS(t2)
and pMBS(t3).
VI. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the likeliness that the at-
tacker succeeds in cheating our secure position schemes
by guessing the positions of the covert base stations.
This probability will notably depend on the size of
attacker’s search space (which depends on base station
power ranges) and on the precision of the positioning
system.
Here, we focus on the position verification protocol
described in Section IV. We define the attacker’s success
as an event when the attacker A reports a position pF
different from its true position (pF = pA), and the CBS
concludes that pA = pF . This event will realize only if
|dcF −dmF | ≤ ∆. This essentially means that for a chosen
position pF an attacker needs to guess the distance to the
covert base station. The probability of attackers success
is therefore
Pr(|dcF − dmF | ≤ ∆|pF = pA) (1)
In our analysis we assume that the positioning takes
place on a disk (2D), and in a ball (3D). The position
of the hidden base station and the reported position of
the attacker are therefore on a disk (or in the ball). We
assume that the position of the base station is uniformly
chosen on the disk (in the ball). Other geometries can
be observed, but we have chosen the circles as they best
reflect the power ranges of the devices.
A. Attacker’s average success probability
To compute the average probability of attacker’s suc-
cess, we assume that the attacker chooses its fake po-
sition pF uniformly over the disk/ball. In this case, the
probability distribution function (pdf) of its distance to
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Fig. 6. Probability distribution function of the distance dcF =
d(pF , pCBS) on a disk (PrD) and in a ball (PrS), when pCBS
and pF are chosen uniformly over the disk and ball, respectively.
the uniformly chosen position of the hidden base station
is given by [38]:
PrD(dcF = d) =
4d
πR2
cos−1(
d
2R
)
− 2d
2
πR3
√
1− d
2
4R2
(2)
for a disk and by
PrS(dcF = d) =
3d2
R3
− 9d
3
4R4
+
3d5
16R6
(3)
for a ball, where R is the radius of the disk/ball. PrD
and PrS are shown on Figure 6. The maximum values
of these functions are PrD(dcF = 0.84R) = 0.809 and
PrS(dcF = 1.05R) = 0.942. This means that when the
attacker guesses what is the length of d(pF , pCBS , it will
have the highest chance of success if it guesses that it
is 0.84R, and hence sets dmF = 0.84R. In this case, the
probability of attacker’s success will be:
PrD,uni =
∫ 0.84R+∆
0.84R−∆
PrDdd ≈ 0.809× 2∆
R
(4)
PrS,uni =
∫ 1.05R+∆
1.05R−∆
PrSdd ≈ 0.942× 2∆
R
(5)
These approximations hold for ∆ << R. These results
are important as they show that the the probability of
attacker’s success grows linearly with the positioning and
ranging error ∆ and inversely proportional to radius of
the region in which the hidden base station is places.
This means that the probability of attackers success is
inversely proportional to the square root of the space
in which positioning is taking place. Simply, the more
precise the positioning and distance measurement is,
and the larger the space is, the more secure is position
verification.
The probability of attacker’s success can be signifi-
cantly reduced if multiple covert base stations are used
for position verification. In that case, the probability of
attacker’s success is simply
PrnD,uni ≈ (0.809×
2∆
R
)n (6)
PrnS,uni ≈ (0.942×
2∆
R
)n (7)
The probability of attacker’s success in both disk and
ball can therefore be upper-bounded by Prnuni = (2∆R )
n
.
B. Attacker’s maximum success probability
So far, we have assumed that the attacker chooses
pF uniformly, meaning that we have assumed that the
position at which the attacker wishes to pretend to be
can be anywhere within the disk/ball. Here, we observe
what is position pF , for which the attacker will have
the highest probability of success. We show that the
attacker has the highest probability of success (Pmax)
if it chooses its fake position pF at the center of the
disk/ball and if it chooses dmF = R as its fake measured
distance to CBS. This probability is as follows (for disk):
PrD(dcF < d) =
d2π
R2π
PrD(dcF = d) =
δ
δd
PrD(dcF < d)
=
2dπ
R2π
PmaxD = PrD(dcF = R) =
2
R
(8)
Similarly for the ball, we obtain that PrS(dcF = R) = 3R .
From this it follows that the maximum probabilities of
the attacker’s success PmaxnD ≈ (4∆R )n and PmaxnS ≈
(6∆R )
n
. This analysis shows that in the worst-case sce-
nario, the maximum probability of attacker’s success is
approx 2.5 times (disk, 2D) and 3 times (ball, 3D) the
average probability of attacker’s success (when n = 1).
Intuitive proof: It is sufficient to observe that the set
with the highest number of points equidistant from a
single point p in a disc/ball is the set of points on a
circle (sphere) of radius R, when p is at the center of a
disk/ball.
C. Further reducing the probability of attacker’s success
Attacker’s success can be further reduced by increas-
ing the space in which the covert base stations can be
positioned. So far we have assumed that the region in
CBS
positioning
region
detection region
(where CBSs can be
placed)
R'
R
pA
Fig. 7. Positioning and detection region. If the base stations can be
positioned outside of the positioning zone, that the probability of the
attacker’s success can be further decreased.
which the device proves its position (positioning region)
is the same as the region within which the covert base
stations are positioned. However, the covert base stations
can be placed also outside of the positioning region
(around the positioning region). The maximal distance
of the covert base stations to the positioning region
will depend on the power range of the attacker’s device
and on the antenna sensitivity of the base stations. This
is illustrated on Figure 7. In this case, the maximum
probability of attacker’s success is further reduced from
PmaxD ≈ 4∆R and PmaxS ≈ 6∆R to Pmax′D ≈ 4∆R′
and Pmax′S ≈ 6∆R′ , respectively, as R′ > R.
This example further shows that regardless of the size
of the positioning region (which can be arbitrarily small),
the probability of attacker’s success can be small if the
detection region is sufficiently large.
D. Sensitivity
In this subsection, we analyze the frequency of false
positives and false negatives as a function of the expected
positioning and ranging error ∆. If the authority sets ∆
to 0, the probability of the attacker’s success will be 0,
but due to the positioning and ranging errors the system
will reject all reported positions, even if the device is not
faking its position. In this case, the frequency of false
negatives will therefore be 1. Similarly, if ∆ is set to 2R
(maximal distance in the positioning region of radius R),
then the probability of the attacker’s success will be 1
(if the reported position is in the center of the disk/ball).
However, then, all the false positions of the attacker will
be accepted and the frequency of false negatives will be
1. It is therefore important to set ∆ such that it minimizes
the false negatives and false positives. This means that
∆ should be chosen as a minimum value that properly
reflects positioning and ranging errors.
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Fig. 8. The frequency of false positives and false negatives, and a crossover error rate for σ = 0.005R,n = 10 (a), σ = 0.005R,n = 5
(b), σ = 0.01R,n = 10 (c), σ = 0.01R,n = 5 (d). s = 1/k is the sensitivity. ∆ = kσ is the tolerated positioning and ranging error. σ is
the standard deviation of the positioning and ranging error.
As we have already noted, CBSs accept the position
of the node if |dcF − dmF | ≤ ∆. There are two sources
of error in this system. The first error is the positioning
error errorP , which is contained in the reported position
pF . The second error is the ranging error errorR and it is
contained in the distance measurement of dmF . The total
error in |dcF−dmF | is therefore error = errorP+errorR.
If positioning and ranging errors are already known and
if we can assume that they are gaussian errorP ∼
N(0, σ2P ) and errorR ∼ N(0, σ2R) the the total error
of |dcF − dmF | is error ∼ N(0, σ2 = σ2P + σ2R). If the
errors are non-gaussian or even not independent, then we
do assume that the joint distribution of the error can be
obtained experimentally.
Without any loss of generality, we can express ∆ in
terms of σ as follows:
∆ = kσ (9)
where k is a positive real number and σ is the standard
deviation of error (σ = √σP + σR) for independent
gaussian errors). In the case that error is gaussian,
the probability that dcF − dmF falls within the interval
[−kσ, kσ] is given by [34]:
Pr(−kσ < dcF − dmF < kσ) =
2√
π
∫ k√
2
0
e−u
2
du
= erf(
k√
2
) (10)
Here, interval [−kσ, kσ] is called the confidence interval.
The frequency of false positives can be than computed
as:
PrFP = 1− Pr(−kσ < dcF − dmF < kσ) (11)
i.e., as the probability that dcF − dmF does not fall within
the interval [−kσ, kσ].
The frequency of false negatives is simply the proba-
bility of attacker’s success given by (in 2D):
PrFN =
4∆
R
=
4kσ
R
(12)
For n covert base stations, these probabilities are
defined as follows. The frequency of false positives is
defined as a probability that at least one of the covert
base stations rejects the reported position, even if the
position is correct. This probability is given by
PrnFP = 1− (Pr(−kσ < dcF − dmF < kσ))n (13)
The frequency of false negatives is defined as the prob-
ability that all the base stations accept the reported
position even if this position is false. This probability
is given simply as a probability of attacker’s success for
n covert base stations:
PrnFN = (
4kσ
R
)n (14)
Figure 8 shows the the frequency of false positives
and false negatives as a function sensitivity s. Here,
s is defined as 1/k. Sensitivity s is thus inversely
proportional to the expected error ∆ and is a measure
of how sensitive is the position verification to errors; if
s = ∞, this means that the system is very sensitive, and
that positioning and ranging errors will are not tolerated,
if s = 0, this means that the system tolerates any error.
Consequently, the frequencies of false positives and false
negatives depend on s.
Figure 8 shows the frequencies of false positives and
false negatives for 10 and 5 covert base stations, and for
σ = 0.005R (0.5% of R) and σ = 0.01R (1% of R).
The emphasis in these figures is on the crossover error
rate. The crossover error rate is the error rate at which
the false positive frequency equals the frequency of false
negatives. From these figures we observe, as expected,
that with the increase in the number of covert base
stations, and with the reduction of the standard deviation
of the positioning and ranging error σ, the crossover
error rate can significantly reduced. If the number of
covert base stations is 5 and if σ = 0.01, the crossover
error rate will be 0.0002. This error rate is significantly
reduced to 2× 10−9 if the σ is reduced to 0.005 and if
the number of covert base stations is increased to 10.
Even if the crossover error rate is a good indicator of
system performance, we emphasize that the security of
the system can be significantly improved if the system
can allow for a higher false positive frequency. We show
on Figure 9 the frequency of false negatives (probability
of attacker’s success) as a function of the number of
covert base stations, given that the frequency of false
negatives is set to 1%. This figure shows that with the
frequency of false negatives set to 1%, the probability
of attacker’s success is significantly lower than the
crossover error rate. We therefore observe that with 5 or
more covert base stations, the probability of attacker’s
success is lower than 10−5 with standard deviation of
error smaller than 0.03R.
We can also observe that with positioning systems that
exhibit high standard deviation of error (up to 30% or the
region radius R), the probability of attacker’s success can
still be significantly reduced by increasing the number
of covert base stations. For example, with σ = 0.2R and
20 hidden stations, the probability of attacker’s success
is only 2× 10−6.
E. Integration with existing positioning systems
A number of systems for positioning and ranging of
wireless devices have already been proposed, based on
the propagation of RF, ultrasound and infrared signals.
Most of these systems can be adapted to work with
covert base stations. Here, we present a short overview
of the precision and area sizes of existing positioning
and ranging systems and we discuss how they can be
integrated with secure positioning based on covert base.
If positioning is based on GPS, the accuracy of the
positioning will be in 95% of cases better than 1m. RF
time of flight techniques being developed for positioning
GSM and CDMA Position aim to provide accuracy
of 50-100m and 10m, in the case of UL-TOA, GSM
and AGPS, CDMA, respectively. Note here that these
systems are designed for area and cell sizes which can
have radiuses of 500m (in highly dense urban areas) to
35km (in countryside). Indoor, positioning with WiFi
based on signal strength measurements with location
fingerprinting can achieve positioning accuracy of 2-
3m, whereas ultrasound-based ranging and positioning
systems can be accurate up to several centimeters. Ultra
wide band (UWB) time-of-flight based systems work
both indoor and outdoor. Indoor they can achieve rang-
ing precision better than 1m for ranges of up to 50m
and positioning accuracy of up to 15cm. Outdoor the
accuracy of UWB positioning and ranging systems can
be also very high, approx. 1m for distances of up to
2km [16]. All the numbers presented in this paragraph
are rough approximations of accuracies of these systems;
each of these systems can perform better or worse, if one
or more of system parameters change.
Here, we use the term accuracy very loosely as the
measures of accuracy vary from one system to another.
For example, if GPS positioning is used for providing
position reference to a device, and UWB ranging is used
for position verification, the standard deviation of the
error can be estimated at up to 4 meters. Given that
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Fig. 9. The frequency of false negatives (probability of attacker’s
success) if the frequency of false positives is set to 0.01R.
the range of UWB positioning can be up to 2km than
σ < 0.005R. Indoor, if ultrasound is used for positioning
and ultrasonic ranging for verification, we can assume
the standard deviation of error to be of the order of
20 centimeters and ranges up to 20m, meaning that
σ = 0.01R. As we have shown in Figures 8 and 9, the
probability of attacker’s success in these scenarios will
can then be as low as 10−35 (in best case).
VII. RELATED WORK
In the last decade, a number of indoor positioning
systems were proposed, based notably on infrared [43],
ultrasound [44], [35], received radio signal strength [3],
[20], [7] and time-of-flight radio signal propagation
techniques [27], [15]. These positioning techniques were
then extended and used for positioning in sensor and ad
hoc networks [13], [6], [9], [33], [32], [42], [30], [14].
Recently, a number of secure distance and location
verification have been proposed. Brands and Chaum [5]
proposed a distance bounding protocol that can be used
to verify the proximity of two devices connected by a
wired link. Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [41] proposed a
new distance bounding protocol, based on ultrasound and
radio wireless communication. In that work, the authors
also propose to make use of multiple base stations to
narrow down the area in which the nodes lie. However,
as this proposal is based on ultrasound distance bound-
ing, it can therefore be used only for the verification
of nodes’ positions, and only if external nodes have
no access to the area of interest. In [22], the authors
propose a mechanism called “packet leashes” that aims
at preventing wormhole attacks by making use of the
geographic location of the nodes (geographic leashes),
or of the transmission time of the packet between
the nodes (temporal leashes). Kuhn [25] proposed an
asymmetric security mechanism for navigation signals.
That proposal aims at securing systems like GPS [18].
Capkun and Hubaux [10] propose a technique called
verifiable multilateration, based on distance-bounding,
which enables a local infrastructure to verify positions of
the nodes. They further show how that technique can be
extended for secure positioning of a network of sensors.
Lazos et al. [26] proposed a set of techniques for secure
positioning of a network of sensors based on directional
antennas and distance bounding. Li et al. [28] propose
statistical methods for securing localization in wireless
sensor networks. Liu et al. [29] propose techniques
for the detection of malicious attacks against beacon-
based location discovery in sensor networks, based on
consistency of received beacons.
Recently, a number of proposals have been made to
protect the anonymity and location privacy of wireless
devices [36], [19], [37], [40], [23], [24].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a novel approach to secure
positioning based on covert (hidden and mobile) base
stations. This approach enables secure positioning with
a broad spectrum of positioning techniques: ultrasonic or
RF, based on received signal strength or on time of signal
flight. We have demonstrated that that this approach can
be easily integrated with several existing node-centric
and infrastructure-centric positioning schemes. We have
shown how security of this approach depends on the
precision of the positioning systems and on the number
of covert base stations.
Our future work includes implementations of our
schemes and their evaluation in various indoor and out-
door scenarios. We furthermore intend to investigate the
applicability of position verification to secure positioning
in mobile ad hoc networks. We also intend to investigate
in more detail the privacy implications of our approach.
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